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Abstract
There are numerous opportunities for adversaries to ob-
serve user behavior remotely on the web. Additionally,
keystroke biometric algorithms have advanced to the point
where user identification and soft biometric trait recogni-
tion rates are commercially viable. This presents a privacy
concern because masking spatial information, such as IP
address, is not sufficient as users become more identifiable
by their behavior. In this work, the well-known Chaum mix
is generalized to a scenario in which users are separated by
both space and time with the goal of preventing an observ-
ing adversary from identifying or impersonating the user.
The criteria of a behavior obfuscation strategy are defined
and two strategies are introduced for obfuscating typing be-
havior. Experimental results are obtained using publicly
available keystroke data for three different types of input,
including short fixed-text, long fixed-text, and long free-text.
Identification accuracy is reduced by 20% with a 25 ms ran-
dom keystroke delay not noticeable to the user.
1. Introduction
The issue of privacy in behavior monitoring has recently
started to gain attention. It is not clear how many organiza-
tions routinely track user behavior and to what extent this
information is being used. On the Internet, the situation is
further complicated by the prevalence of third-party content
which allows identifying attributes and user behavior to be
seen by a number of websites as a result of visiting only a
single page [15]. Behavior tracking is motivated by targeted
advertising, analytics, and law enforcement. The laws and
regulations currently surrounding behavior tracking are rel-
atively lax, although a majority of users negatively view be-
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havioral targeting. In 2012, a study by Pew Research Group
found 68% of respondents to be “not okay” with behav-
ioral targeted advertising, and a 2010 USA Today/Gallup
poll showed 67% of respondents felt that behavioral target-
ing should not be legal [3, 6]. Behavior tracking capabilities
are extended when user keystrokes are added to the mix [4].
The simplicity and ubiquitous nature of keystroke behav-
ior makes it attractive as a biometric modality for computer
users. There are numerous commercial applications and
government interest in the area of keystroke biometrics. To
name a few, keystroke biometrics has recently been consid-
ered as a means of offering students verified certificates for
completing a massively open online course (MOOC) [13].
Funding through DARPA’s Active Authentication program
has helped the field advance considerably, creating partner-
ships between government, academia, and industry [7]. One
of the most commercially successful keystroke biometric
applications is delivered by BehavioSec, a Swedish com-
pany that utilizes typing behavior, among other factors, to
verify the legitimacy of online transactions. In 2015, Be-
havioSec verified over 1.5B transactions from 15M users
across 20 different banks [9].
Behavioral patterns and identifying attributes may be un-
intentionally leaked through keystroke timing information,
which can be remotely observed without a victim’s knowl-
edge or consent. Masking spatial information, such as IP
address through TOR [27], is futile when temporal infor-
mation, such as keystroke timings, can be used for identi-
fication. The consequences of an adversary being able to
observe a victim’s keystrokes are twofold. First, the victim
may be identified by their typing behavior. Even without
having previously observed the victim’s typing behavior,
identifying attributes such as age, gender, handedness, and
native language, can be resolved with reasonable accuracy
[2, 8]. Second, the victim may be impersonated through a
generative model of typing behavior, potentially enabling
an adversary to gain access to a system that implements
keystroke biometric access control.
This paper discusses the implications of typing behavior
that is observable by a third party over the web and pro-
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poses several mechanisms aimed at preserving anonymity.
The goals, constraints, and theoretical limits of keystroke
behavior obfuscation are explored. Section 2 provides fur-
ther motivation and rationale for obfuscating typing behav-
ior and Section 3 reviews some background material and
related work. Two obfuscation strategies are introduced in
Section 4 followed by an empirical evaluation using three
types of keystroke input from publicly available databases
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Motivation
Humans generate events over a wide range of time
scales separated by orders of magnitude, as exemplified by
Newell’s time scale of human action [19]. At the lowest
level are biological events, e.g., the firing of individual neu-
rons on the order of microseconds, and at the highest level
are group and social dynamics which emerge as a result of
higher-frequency events. There is generally less privacy as
one moves up (down in frequency) in Newell’s time scale.
For example, high frequency brain and heart activity, mea-
sured through electroencephalogram (EEG) and electrocar-
diogram (ECG), require specialized sensors and the pres-
ence of the user. On the other hand, lower frequency events
such as email, financial transactions, and mobile device in-
teractions, can typically be observed by a remote third party.
Keystrokes fall in the cognitive band, which lies between
the biological and social bands and where events occur on
the order of milliseconds to seconds. Since keystrokes are
ubiquitous with modern computers and often contain sensi-
tive information, they are the subject of some privacy issues.
The standard desktop computer measures key-press and
key-release events with a clock precision of about 16 ms
and resolution1 of at least 1 ms [11]. Keystroke events are
typically recorded by a keylogger in either a system-wide
context via a hook registered in the kernel or in a sandbox
environment, such as within a single page of a web browser.
In some cases, simply disabling the logging software on
the client is sufficient to ensure that a third party cannot
observe the victim’s keystrokes. An exception to this rule
comes in the form of interactive applications, which gener-
ate network traffic immediately after a key is pressed. Even
if third party logging software is disabled on the client, e.g.,
only trusted Javascript sources are enabled, network timing
information can be used to build a profile of typing behav-
ior since keystrokes result in the immediate transmission of
packets over a network. Key-press times can be obtained re-
motely without installing a keylogger on the victim’s com-
puter by observing the network traffic generated from an in-
teractive application, such as SSH in interactive mode [24]
and Google Suggestions service [26]. A timing attack on
1Clock resolution is the degree to which a measurement can be made
and clock precision is the degree to which a measurement can be repeated.
SSH network traffic timestamps collected during password
entry can provide about 1 bit of information in cracking a
password. [24] verified that the key-press latencies can be
reliably determined from the packet inter-arrival times from
interactive SSH traffic, as the time between the actual press
of a key and packet creation by the kernel is negligible.
2.1. Identification
Identification is performed by enrolling a user’s
keystroke samples into a database during a trusted session.
The samples make up the user’s keystroke template. For
fixed input, such as a password, this may take the form of
various key hold durations (the time from key press to key
release) and key press/key release latencies (the time be-
tween successive key presses or key release to key press),
such as in [12]. For free-text input, a set of descriptive
statistics on the various time intervals may be defined, such
as in [25]. Note that in this work, only timing information
is considered. Some works that deal with free-text input
also consider linguistic features in an attempt to capture the
author’s stylometry, or writing style. This work does not at-
tempt to mask information that may be leaked through lin-
guistic analysis, although there have been other attempts in
successfully doing so [10].
The identification of soft biometric traits without a user’s
prior enrollment is also a real possibility. In this scenario, a
user’s typing behavior may reveal soft attributes such as age,
gender, handedness, and native language. Such an attack is
feasible with several publicly available databases that con-
tain soft biometric labels and the relative ease in collecting
a new database with the desired labels through, e.g., Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk. In [8], age, gender, and handedness
are classified with between 80% and 100% accuracy using
both fixed text and free text input. This database is made
publicly available. In [2], handedness, gender, and native
language are classified with accuracies that significantly de-
viate from chance.
2.2. Impersonation
Impersonation is performed by mimicking keystroke be-
havior with the intent of being recognized as the victim.
This represents a non-zero-effort attack on behalf of an im-
postor. With access to the victim’s computer, a spoofing
attack such as in [22] can be utilized. Observing a victim’s
keystrokes directly allows for typing behavior to be easily
replicated. Without any knowledge of the victim’s typing
pattern, an attack such as [23] can be used. The latter work
used a template enumeration technique, in which an inde-
pendent keystroke database was used to reduce the search
space of typing behavior. This works well for shorter strings
and assumes that the verification system allows multiple at-
tempts.
[18] provides empirical evidence for a two-state gener-
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Figure 1. Chaum mix. Eve is able to observe a single arrival pro-
cess and must discern which user owns each event.
ative model of typing behavior in which the user can be in
either a passive or active state. Given key-press latencies
with missing key names, the model is then used to predict
the key-press latencies of a user by exploiting the linear re-
lationship between inter-key distance and key-press latency.
The proposed generative model uses this partial information
to perform a key-press-only sample-level attack on a vic-
tim’s keystroke dynamics template. Results show that some
users are more susceptible to this type of attack than oth-
ers. For about 10% of users, the spoofed samples obtain
classifier output scores of at least 50% of those obtained by
authentic samples, and with at least 50 observed keystrokes
the chance of successful verification over a zero-effort at-
tack doubles on average.
3. Background
There are primarily two goals in obfuscating keystroke
behavior. The first is to limit an adversary’s capability to
identify a user. Under this goal, the user wishes to re-
main anonymous within a pool of U users. Anonymity
is achieved when the probability of correctly identifying
the user is no greater than 1U . With cooperation from all
the users in the pool, it is relatively easy to obtain perfect
anonymity for every user. Each user needs only to behave
in some predefined way agreed upon by the pool. If the be-
havior of every user is exactly the same, the best strategy for
identification is simply a random guess out of the U users.
The second goal is to limit an adversary’s capability to
predict user behavior, which is necessary for impersonation.
This goal is quite different, in that the user wishes for the
time and duration of a future keystroke to be unpredictable
after having generated N keystrokes. Perfect unpredictabil-
ity is achieved when the expected symmetric mean absolute
percentage error (SMAPE) of the predictions go to 1 [21].
The SMAPE can go to 1 when either the actual time interval
between events, τN+1, or predicted time interval between
events, τˆN+1, is infinite. The actual time interval is infinite
when the user plans on waiting indefinitely before generat-
ing another keystroke. The predicted time interval is infinite
if the adversary’s model predicts an infinite estimated delay
until the next keystroke. Neither of these situations are prac-
tical and thus perfect unpredictability can generally not be
achieved.
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Figure 2. User mix. Eve is able to observe multiple arrival pro-
cesses and must discern which user owns each process.
Both goals in obfuscating keystroke behavior call for dif-
ferent strategies. Consider two extreme examples. In the
first, every user decides to generate keystrokes with exactly
the same frequency. That is, the time between events τ is the
same for every user. Under this strategy, perfect anonymity
is achieved. However, each user’s actions can also be pre-
dicted exactly and the masking strategy fails to address the
predictability criterion. Consider a different strategy, in
which each user generates keystrokes according to a Pois-
son process. Let the users have rates λ1  · · ·  λU . On
a per-user basis, predictive accuracy is relatively low, as the
time intervals are independent and identically distributed,
following an exponential distribution. However, users can
be easily identified over time by their expected time inter-
val, or event frequency.
A more effective strategy would be to let each user gener-
ate events according to a Poisson process with rate λ. With
cooperation from every user, perfect anonymity is achieved
as the Poisson process is memoryless and the resulting dis-
tributions of time intervals from each user will appear to
be the same. Unfortunately, this strategy is generally not
practical since it requires the cooperation from every user.
Some users who naturally type at a rate much lower than λ
would be forced to increase their speed. Conversely, users
who naturally type at a rate much higher than λ would be
forced to slow down.
Chaum mixes can be used to provide anonymity to users
behind a router, in which cooperation is assumed [5]. This
scenario is shown in Figure 1, where users Alice and Bob
are behind a router and wish to transmit a series of pack-
ets. The mix reorders the packets by introducing a random
delay to each packet. An eavesdropper, Eve, observes the
sequence of reordered packets before they reach the appli-
cation, however cannot discern whether each packet came
from Alice or Bob. The identity and temporal behavior of
Alice and Bob are protected by the mix.
The anonymity of the mixing strategy is given by the
expected entropy of the observed packets,
A = lim
N→∞
1
N
E [H (U1, . . . , UN )] (1)
where Un is the identity of the nth observed packet and
H is the entropy function. Without any constraints, the
optimal strategy that maximizes anonymity can be shown
to require an infinite delay [16]. This is due to the mix
waiting for all packets from both Alice and Bob and then
randomly selecting one of the
(
2N
N
)
permutations for the
packet reordering. This strategy is not practical for a num-
ber of reasons, one being that it would require an infinite
buffer size. With a finite buffer size, the upper bound on the
maximum-achievable anonymity decreases. Despite this, a
reasonable level of anonymity can be achieved with practi-
cal constraints [28].
The scenario considered in this work is a generalization
of the Chaum mix, shown in Figure 2. Since the Chaum mix
requires the cooperation of all the users, i.e., every user must
be on the same network, it is a global obfuscation strategy,
or global mix. If the assumption of cooperation is relaxed,
then an obfuscation strategy without cooperation must be
developed. This type of strategy is provided by a user mix.
A user mix is appropriate when there is no cooperation be-
tween users, or the events from different users are separated
by both space and time2.
Compared to the Chaum mix that operates globally on
events from every user, the user mix operates exclusively
on events from only one user. The mix for each user is
atomic, in the sense that it operates independently of every
other user. Different users may employ different obfusca-
tion strategies or no strategy at all. The mix separates the
generating process, the sequence of events from the per-
spective of the user, from the arrival process, the sequence
of events as seen by the application. The goal of the mix
is to provide anonymity and unpredictability at the arrival
process.
This scenario is depicted in Figure 2, where Alice and
Bob both generate events and wish to remain anonymous
and unpredictable. An eavesdropper, Eve, is able to observe
the sequence of events from each user after passing through
the mix, and she knows that there are two users in the sys-
tem. From the perspective of Eve, it is not clear which se-
quence belongs to each user, as she can only observe the
arrival processes. The technical conditions of the user mix
are summarized as follows.
1. Alice and Bob have zero knowledge of each other’s
behavior and don’t cooperate.
2. Eve can see multiple arrival processes, but cannot discern
which process belongs to each user
3. Each mix has a source of randomness unknown to Eve.
4. Event order is preserved by the mix.
4. Obfuscation strategies
The user mix delays events by temporarily storing them
in a buffer before releasing them to the application. With-
2For example, consider keystrokes recorded by a web application. The
keystrokes from two different sessions could have been recorded days apart
and come from entirely different network locations.
Finite The expected delay between the user and the
arrival process should not grow unbounded.
Anonymous The mix should make it difficult to identify
the user.
Unpredictable The mix should make it difficult to predict
future behavior.
Table 1. Desirable properties of a user mix.
out access to future events, and under the constraint that
events cannot be permuted, the only operation that can be
performed is to delay an event. An event consists of a key
press or key release. The constraint that events cannot be
permuted ensures that the characters appear at the arrival
process in the order and form (e.g., case or special symbol)
they were generated.
There are a few caveats in obfuscating temporal behav-
ior. Since the only action is to delay, a lag is introduced
between the generation of an event by the user and the ob-
servation of the event in the application. Thus, it may not be
possible to use a mix in some real-time systems. For many
human-computer interaction applications, a small lag is ac-
ceptable and would not be noticed by the user. As the lag
increases, the movement time and error rate on behalf of the
user also increase [14].
A user mix should possess several properties, summa-
rized in Table 1. The expected lag between the generated
events and observed events should be finite. The size of
the event buffer ultimately determines how large the lag can
grow to. If the tolerated lag is unbounded, then the number
of events that need to be stored will eventually exceed the
size of the buffer. A user mix should also protect the user
from being identified out of a population of users. This con-
dition is more difficult to satisfy, as it requires at least some
global knowledge of other users in the system. A mix that
provides anonymity will emulate the temporal behavior of
the “typical” user. Finally, a mix should make it difficult to
reproduce and predict the temporal behavior of a user.
Analogous to the tradeoff between type I and type II er-
rors on the ROC curve, there is a direct tradeoff between
time lag and the obfuscation capability of the mix. As the
lag decreases, the dependence between the arrival process
and the generating process increase. As the lag increases,
the potential to reduce dependence increases. It is desirable
to have a mix that maximally reduces the dependence be-
tween the generating process and the arrival process for a
given lag.
Let t◦n and τ
◦
n be the true time and time interval of the n
th
event generated by the user, and tn and τn be the observed
time and time interval of the nth event after passing through
the mix. The sequence of tn, or alternatively τn, constitute
the arrival process. The lag, or delay, between the generated
event and observed event is given by δn. Since event order
must be preserved by the mix, it is necessary that tn−1 +
Symbol Description
tn time of events at the arrival process
t◦n time of events at the generating process
τn time interval between events at the arrival process
τ◦n time interval between events at the generating process
δn time lag between the generating and arrival processes
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o
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t n−1
o t n−1 t n
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Figure 3. Summary of user mix operation and variables.
δn−1 < tn + δn. Figure 3 summarize the variables of the
user mix.
Predictability can be measured by the dependence be-
tween τ◦ and τ . Anonymity is given by the dependence
between τA and τB from two random instantiations of the
mix, A and B. Dependence is measured by the mutual in-
formation between two continuous random variables, given
by
I (X,Y ) =
ˆ
Y
ˆ
X
f (x, y) log
[
f (x, y)
f (x) f (y)
]
dxdy (2)
where f (x, y) is the joint probability density function of x
and y.
A mix with that provides perfect unpredictability has
I (τ◦, τ) = 0. Perfect anonymity is achieved when
I
(
τA, τB
)
= 0. Both can be achieved with an unlim-
ited buffer size and delay. To demonstrate this, consider
a mix that samples τ from a uniform distribution, i.e.,
τ ∼ U (0, k). Let τn be the time interval of the arrival
process. If τ◦n+1 < τn, then the lag between the user and
the arrival process must increase by at least τn − τ◦n+1 and
as n → ∞, the lag increases unbounded. In this case,
I (τ◦, τ) = 0 since f (τ◦, τ) = f (τ◦) f (τ), i.e., the ob-
served time intervals are independent from the actual time
intervals. If τ◦n+1 > τn, then the time interval on the ar-
rival process is no longer independent from the actual time
intervals since τn+1 > τ◦n+1 − τn. The next sample will
have τn+1 ∼ U
(
τ◦n+1 − τn, τ◦n+1 − τn + 1
)
, or alterna-
tively P (τn+1 = s) = 1k where τ−τn < s < τ◦n+1−τn+k.
Consequently, the dependence guarantees that f (τ◦, τ) >
f (τ◦) f (τ) and I (τ◦, τ) > 0. Therefore, in practice it is
necessary to introduce a lag constraint in minimizing the
dependence between τ◦ and τ .
There are primarily two ways a time interval mix can
add noise to the time intervals of the arrival process. Let δ
be the lag between τ◦ and τ . The first is by generating a
random delay between the actual events that occur at time
Algorithm 1 Delay mix.
1. Initialize: Let τ◦0 =∞ and t◦0 = 0
2. Generate: Let ln = max (δn−1 − τ◦n, 0) be the lower
bound of the nth delay and δn ∼ U (l,∆) be a random
delay. The event time on the arrival process is given by
tn = t
◦
n + δn
t◦ resulting in the time t◦ + δ at the arrival process. This
type of mix is a delay mix. The second way is to generate τ
directly, referred to as an interval mix.
4.1. Delay mix
The delay mix introduces noise to the time intervals of
the arrival process by randomly delaying each event. For
the nth event at time t◦n, the delay mix generates a ran-
dom delay δn to produce the event time at the arrival pro-
cess, tn = t◦n + δn. Time intervals of the arrival process
are given by τn = (t◦n + δn) −
(
t◦n−1 + δn−1
)
. A uni-
form distribution can be used to generate delays. Let δn ∼
U (max (δn−1 − τ◦n, 0) ,∆), where ∆ is the upper bound on
the delay. The lower bound of max (δn−1 − τ◦n, 0) is nec-
essary to ensure the event order is preserved. Without this
constraint, events will become permuted if τ◦n+δn < δn−1.
The process is summarized in Algorithm 1.
The expected delay is bounded above by ∆. To see this,
consider the two scenarios: τ◦n < δn−1 and τ
◦
n > δn−1.
If τ◦n < δi−1, then the expected lag is simply E [δn] =
∆
2
since the lower bound will always be 0. If τ◦n > δn−1, then
E [δi] =
∆+δn−1−τ◦n
2 which is bounded above by ∆. Given
τ0 =∞, it is true that 0 < δ1 < ∆. By induction, it is also
true that δn−1 < ∆ since τ◦n > 0 .
4.1.1 Example
As an example, consider events occurring at times t◦ =
[0, 5, 7, 11, 14] passing through a delay mix with ∆ = 7.
The actual time intervals are τ◦ = [∞, 5, 2, 4, 3]. The trace
of each variable is shown in Table 2.
Event t◦ τ◦ l δ t τ
0 0 ∞ 0 3 3 ∞
1 5 5 0 6 11 8
2 7 2 4 5 12 1
3 11 4 1 5 16 4
4 14 3 6 6 20 4
Table 2. Delay mix example where t◦ and τ◦ are the actual time
and time interval of the nth event, l is the lower bound of the delay,
δ is the random delay, and t and τ are the time and time interval
of the arrival process.
Algorithm 2 Interval mix.
1. Initialize: Let t◦0 = t0 = 0, τ◦0 = τ0 = ∞, and
u1 > 0.
2. Generate: Let τ˙n ∼ U (0, un) be the desired time in-
terval and t˙n = tn−1 + τ˙n be the desired time of the
arrival process. The arrival process time is given by
tn = max
(
t˙n, t
◦
n
)
.
3. Update: Let un+1 = max
[
un + b
(
t◦n − t˙n
)
, 
]
4.2. Interval mix
Instead of generating delays, the time intervals of the ar-
rival process can be modeled explicitly. The goal of the mix
is to minimize the dependence between τ◦ and τ , and this
strategy will give the mix greater control over the resulting
time intervals. While the delay mix generates δn at each
time step to produce arrival process time tn = t◦n + δn, the
interval mix generates τn to produce tn = tn−1 + τn. With
an infinite delay, this allows the τn to be generated indepen-
dently of τ◦n . With a finite delay, the τn are constrained by
the event rate of the user.
At each time step tn, let the desired time interval be
τ˙n ∼ U (0, un−1) where un−1 is an upper bound param-
eter. If tn−1 + τ˙n > t◦n, then the n
th event is delayed
by δn = tn−1 + τ˙n − t◦n to get the arrival process time
tn = tn−1 + τ˙n. If tn−1 + τ˙n ≤ t◦n, then δn = 0 and
the event is released immediately. The upper bound u is
updated as un = max {un−1 + b [tn − (tn−1 + τ˙n)] , },
where b is a parameter that controls the rate at which un
can change. This update moves the expected time interval
in the direction of the rate of the user. This process is sum-
marized in Algorithm 2.
4.2.1 Example
An example is used to demonstrate the interval mix with
parameter b = 1. Similar as before, the actual event
times are given by t◦ = [0, 5, 7, 11, 14] with time intervals
τ◦ = [∞, 5, 2, 4, 3]. At the first event, there is no delay
between the actual event time and the arrival process, there-
fore t0 = t◦0 = 0. The parameter updates and time intervals
of the arrival process are shown in Table 3. For simplic-
ity, values are sampled from a discrete uniform distribution.
The starting value of u is chosen to be 7 to demonstrate the
adaptability of the mix to the user’s behavior in several it-
erations. The starting value of u can be any positive value
and will quickly converge to an appropriate range.
Event t◦ τ◦ u t˙ τ˙ δ t τ
0 0 ∞ - - - 0 0 ∞
1 5 5 7 3 3 0 5 5
2 7 2 9 11 6 4 11 6
3 11 4 5 15 4 4 15 4
4 14 3 1 16 1 2 16 1
Table 3. Interval mix example where t◦is the actual event time, τ◦
is the actual time interval, u is the interval distribution parameter,
t˙ is the desired event time, t is the arrival process event time, and
τ is the arrival process time interval.
5. Case study
The two time interval obfuscation strategies introduced
in Section 4 are empirically evaluated using publicly avail-
able keystroke datasets with previously published results.
Three different types of keystroke input are considered:
short fixed-text (e.g., password or PIN), long fixed-text
(e.g., copying or transcribing several sentences), and long
free-text (e.g., response to an open-ended question).
Each dataset contains labeled attributes for identity, age,
handedness, and gender. The short fixed-text comes from
[8], the long fixed-text from [1], and the long free-text from
[17]. The short fixed-text dataset contains 110 users with
50 samples per user. Each sample contains one entry in
which the user typed a short passphrase ranging from 17 to
24 characters as described in [8]. The long fixed-text dataset
is a combination of the fixed text from [1] and [17], during
which users copied short sentences and fables. The com-
bined dataset contains 101 users with 10 samples per user
and 123 ± 38 characters per sample. The free text dataset
is also from [17] and contains 127 users with 10 samples
per user. Users were required to respond to open-ended and
essay style questions. The long responses were sliced to
create samples of length 123± 38 to match the distribution
of the long fixed-text dataset.
Classification of each target variable is performed by a
random forest classifier with features and fallback hierar-
chy as described in [17]. The RandomForest classifier in
the sklearn Python package is utilized with 200 estima-
tors and the same features for all three types of keystroke
input. Classification accuracy (ACC) is obtained by a strat-
ified 10 fold cross validation for the identity target. For
the age, handedness, and gender targets, a 110, 101, and
127 cross-fold validation is used for the short fixed-text,
long fixed-text, and long free-text, respectively. In each
fold, a single user’s samples are used as the testing set
and the remainder of the population as the training set.
This emulates an open system, in which soft attributes for
the target user are classified without having previously ob-
served that user’s keystrokes. The sizes of each class in
the training sets are not altered. Thus, the baseline pre-
diction rates coincide with the proportion of the largest
class, which are 0.51 (age ≥ 30), 0.68 (male), 0.88 (right
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1000 891 0.44 0.66 0.67 0.79 0.34 0.35
L
on
g
fr
ee
-t
ex
t 0 0 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.70 0.30 0.15
50 26 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.70 0.31 0.18
100 54 0.51 0.75 0.77 0.70 0.32 0.24
200 126 0.36 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.33 0.30
500 394 0.30 0.69 0.72 0.70 0.33 0.33
1000 876 0.28 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.34 0.35
Table 4. Delay mix experimental results. Id.=identity,
Gen.=gender, Han.=handedness, PP=press-press latency SMAPE,
DU=duration SMAPE.
handed) for age, gender, and handedness targets for all
three datasets combined. Predictions are made for both the
press-press latency and duration using the mean time in-
terval up to the observed event, P̂Pn =< PPn−11 > and
D̂Un =< DU
n−1
1 > where PPn and DUn are the press-
press latency and duration of the nth keystroke, respec-
tively. Source code for the experiments in this work is avail-
able at https://github.com/vmonaco/keystroke-obfuscation.
Using each dataset, classification accuracies for each tar-
get variable are obtained before and after applying each
masking strategy. The mean lag δ¯ between the generating
process and arrival process is also calculated for each pa-
rameter choice. Table 4 contains experimental results using
the delay mix for various values of ∆ and Table 5 contains
experimental results using the interval mix for various val-
ues of b. The classification accuracies of each mix as a func-
tion of the mean lag δ¯ are summarized in Figure 4.
6. Conclusions
The results in this work suggest that it is possible to ob-
fuscate keystroke behavior with a delay that is not notice-
able to the user, however the time lag between the user
and the application remains a practical constraint. With a
25 ms delay, identification accuracy is reduced by approx-
imately 20% on average, and in most cases a 500 ms de-
lay is needed to halve the identification accuracy. Soft bio-
metric trait classification accuracies, which are initially near
chance accuracy, are relativity unaffected by the obfuscated
keystrokes. Results may differ in a scenario where, e.g.,
only the unlabeled testing data is obfuscated. Prediction
errors of the duration and press-press latency increase as
expected using both types of obfuscation strategy.
An important point is that the proposed methods operate
b δ¯ Id. Age Gen. Han. PP DU
Sh
or
tfi
xe
d-
te
xt 0.0 0 0.55 0.69 0.75 0.70 0.20 0.14
0.1 24 0.33 0.72 0.77 0.70 0.19 0.18
0.5 50 0.21 0.74 0.76 0.70 0.24 0.27
1.0 70 0.17 0.75 0.78 0.70 0.29 0.36
1.5 90 0.15 0.72 0.77 0.70 0.33 0.43
2.0 117 0.13 0.74 0.78 0.70 0.37 0.49
L
on
g
fix
ed
-t
ex
t 0.0 0.00 0.86 0.64 0.58 0.80 0.31 0.16
0.1 471 0.57 0.63 0.64 0.80 0.32 0.26
0.5 1566 0.50 0.65 0.66 0.79 0.40 0.37
1.0 2544 0.42 0.59 0.65 0.79 0.46 0.46
1.5 3570 0.35 0.64 0.66 0.80 0.50 0.53
2.0 4218 0.32 0.65 0.59 0.80 0.54 0.58
L
on
g
fr
ee
-t
ex
t 0.0 0 0.71 0.72 0.78 0.70 0.30 0.15
0.1 385 0.37 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.32 0.26
0.5 1093 0.30 0.63 0.75 0.70 0.40 0.39
1.0 1840 0.27 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.47 0.49
1.5 2321 0.23 0.65 0.68 0.70 0.51 0.56
2.0 3783 0.18 0.64 0.77 0.70 0.56 0.61
Table 5. Interval mix experimental results.
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Figure 4. Time lag vs classification accuracy for each type of
keystroke input and target variable.
at the keystroke event level and not at the network packet
level. Only in certain situations do keystroke events corre-
spond to network packets, such as interactive web applica-
tions. Another realistic scenario is one in which Eve resides
on a workstation, and Alice and Bob are users typing on a
peripheral USB keyboard. The proposed obfuscation strate-
gies could be implemented in hardware, e.g., as a device
that sits between the keyboard and the computer. This de-
vice would ensure a given level of anonymity by randomly
delaying the USB events before they reach the workstation.
The hardware implementation may prove more secure than
the software implementation, and it avoids interference with
the application (such as disabling Javascript on a web page
and subsequently losing other functionality).
Future work should investigate additional obfuscation
strategies and scenarios, such as training on normal data and
testing obfuscated data. Additionally, a major limitation of
this work is that the proposed obfuscation strategies ignore
the possibility that only a single user utilizes a mix and can
be easily detected. The susceptibility of additional features
and classifiers should also be investigated with the proposed
obfuscation strategies. Temporal behavior obfuscation is
a relatively unexplored area. The described strategies can
be applied to network traffic to hinder device fingerprinting
and network traffic classification based on packet inter ar-
rival times, such as those described in [20]. It can also be
applied to lower-frequency events, such as financial trans-
actions, although it is not clear if there would be any benefit
in doing so.
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